

Do early integration agreements and action plans help not-yet-unemployed persons to avoid unemployment?

Findings from a randomized field experiment

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Abstract: Public employment services try to smooth transitions between jobs and shorten unemployment durations. Our paper contributes to the sparse literature on pre-unemployment interventions. We conducted a field experiment in five German labor market agencies, where we randomly assigned individuals into treatment groups. First, we investigate in as far as an intended early conclusion of an integration agreements between not yet-unemployed jobseekers and their caseworkers contribute to continued employment (either at the current firm or at another employer) and helps to avoid unemployment. Second, we investigate if an action plan form aimed at activating job seekers even before their first meeting with a caseworker had an effect on these outcomes. We find in average no systematic effects of both instruments (and their interaction) on the risks to exit the state as a not-yet unemployed job-seeker, exit the current employment relationship, take-up a new job, or enter unemployment. However, we find a slightly higher share of recalls among those with early integration agreements.

Keywords: Unemployment, job seeker, integration agreements, randomized control trial, monitoring, counselling

JEL codes: J68, J64, C93

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1 Motivation

Counselling and job search assistance for the unemployed is a core part of active labor market policies. During recent years the focus has partly shifted on individuals who have not lost their job yet, and the idea of pre-unemployment interventions is meanwhile deeply anchored in recent policy concepts (Csillag et al. 2018). The underlying idea is that early meetings with caseworkers before unemployment entry could smoothen the transitions into new jobs and avoid that individuals actually experience a period of unemployment – thus avoiding potential stigma effects of unemployment and losses of human capital for the individual as well as productivity losses and costly benefit payments for the economy.

As part of the counselling process, in many countries caseworkers conclude written and signed integration agreements with job seekers – this includes e.g. the “Eingliederungsvereinbarung” in Germany, the “Betreuungsplan” in Austria, the “Job Plan” in Denmark, the “Jobseeker Agreement” in the UK, and the “WERKplan” in the Netherlands (Eppel et al. 2012, Konle-Seidl 2012). These agreements might be concluded before as well as after unemployment entry. Van den Berg et al. (2021) conduct a causal analysis for the effects of integration agreements in German labor market agencies for already unemployed workers.

In contrast, our paper contributes to the sparse literature on pre-unemployment interventions. First, we investigate in as far as an early use of written integration agreements for not yet-unemployed jobseekers helps to avoid unemployment and to contribute to job-to-job-transitions. Second, we investigate if an additional option could contribute in meeting these objectives. An action plan form was developed for the field experiment and aimed at strengthening the role of job seekers and their personal responsibility in the job placement process. Job seekers were asked to contemplate on and fill-out the action plan form before their first meeting with a caseworker (while the integration agreement is concluded during the first meeting).

For our analysis, we conducted a field experiment in five German labor market agencies, where we randomly assigned individuals into four treatment groups. We find in average small effects of both instruments (and of their interaction) on particular competing risks to leave unemployment. We do not find any effects on accumulated days in different labor market states during the year after the randomization took place.

The field experiment analyzed in this paper is a follow-up on a first trial on the timing of integration agreements that we carried out during 2012 in seven labor market agencies. As has been mentioned above, the focus of that experiment, however, was on already unemployed persons and the effect of integration agreements on unemployment duration. Van den Berg et al. (2014) present results from accompanying caseworker surveys, where caseworkers were asked about their use and assessment of integration agreements. Results showed that assessments vary greatly depending on the profile of the jobseekers. In the case of unemployed that caseworkers assess to be particularly close to the market but also those who with severe integration impediments, almost half of the interviewees does not perceive integration agreements as helpful for integration. On

the other hand, it is especially appreciated by caseworkers when they assess jobseekers to be in need of activation or qualification. Causal results for that trial show (van den Berg et al. 2021) that integration agreements have on average a small positive effect on entering employment within a year, which is driven by individuals with adverse labor market prospects.

The existing literature on the causal effects of pre-unemployment interventions has so far mainly focused on measures related to group layoffs (Csillag et al. 2018). Cavaco et al. (2013) investigated the effects of a French training program for displaced workers during the 1990's. Winter-Ebmer (2006) analyzed a program combining job search assistance, occupational re-orientation and professional training in Austria that was in place during the large-scale restructuring of the steel industry in the 1980's. Both studies find that the programs increased time in employment.

Another strand of the literature focuses on early interventions during unemployment in general. In an overview article, Rosholm (2014) concludes that meetings with caseworkers can be an effective tool early in an unemployment period, when chances of reemployment are still high. Maibaum et al. (2017) analyze a Danish experiment and find that frequent meetings between newly unemployed persons and caseworkers positively affect employment rates in the medium and long run. In contrast, they do not find such effects for group meetings or mandatory activation programs. An interesting question is in as far the commitment of unemployed persons to invest effort in job search could be strengthened. For South Africa, Abel et al. (2019) conduct a field investigate with young unemployed to investigate the effect of plan-making on job search and employment. Completing a job search plan had effects on the number of applications and on the channels used for job search. As a result, the plan-making group received more job offers and had higher employment rates.

2 Institutional framework and analyzed instruments

In Germany, unemployed individuals can receive contribution-based unemployment benefits if they fulfill the eligibility criteria. If they are not (or not any longer) entitled to unemployment benefits and meet certain needs criteria, they can receive tax funded basic income support. Our field experiment took place in the unemployment insurance system. In this system, the replacement rate amounts to 60–67 percent of the previous wage, dependent on whether there are dependent children in the household or not. The maximum benefit duration varies depends on the employment history of workers and is up to 24 months.

To ensure early activation, German law requires individuals to register as job seekers three months prior to the end of an employment relationship if they know that much in advance, or three days after receiving notice of the end of the employment relationship the latest. Even seamless follow-up employment only exempts from the duty to report if they have been agreed on by the last possible day for registering. The registration can be made in person, by telephone, in writing or via an online service of the Federal Employment Agency (in which case the personal registration

must be made up by appointment). Violations of the obligation to register results in a cut-off period of one week for unemployment benefits.

Employees are informed about the expected end date of their employment relationship if they have a temporary contract or as soon as they receive a dismissal notice. It can be expected that employers will make full use of the existing deadlines to avoid demotivating effects on employees. The statutory periods of protection against dismissal are regulated in the German Civil Code. An employer can terminate the employment relationship with a notice period of four weeks by the fifteenth or the end of a calendar month. The notice period increases with tenure to one (two) [three] {more than three} months at the end of the calendar month if the employment relationship lasted two (five) [eight] {more than ten} years. During a trial period, an employment relationship can be terminated with two weeks' notice. Small businesses can settle exceptions in individual contracts. Collective bargaining agreements can shorten or extend the notice periods. Stephan (2016) shows that only a small share of job seekers with permanent contracts have more than eight years of tenure (and thus a notice period of at least three months), while a relatively large share of those with temporary contracts continue to work at the same employer.

Labor market agencies offer an appointment for an early meeting soon after registration – before unemployment entry – for those who registered as a job seeker. However, it is generally accepted if job seekers apologize for this meeting with good reason, e.g. because they do not want to miss attendance at their current employer.

During the first meeting, caseworkers usually conclude the first integration agreement with the - often not-yet unemployed - job seeker. This is the first element of the placement process we investigate. The ideal is that both parties develop these agreements together and that duties and rights of both sides are documented in the agreement. The agreement should be signed by the caseworker and by the job seeker. Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows a typical example of how such an agreement looks. If the job seeker denies his or her signature, the caseworker could set the document into force one-sided. These integration agreements have several functions: They should increase the transparency and commitment for both actors involved. Furthermore, they are supposed to strengthen the personal responsibility of job seekers. The agreement should also serve to document the integration strategy and thus contribute to quality assurance and quality control (Deutscher Bundestag 2001, p. 31). Ultimately, it should help to avoid long-term unemployment by stating the benefits and efforts required for professional integration (Deutscher Bundestag 2001, p. 7). If unemployment benefit recipients fail to fulfill the obligations from the integration agreement, a cutoff period of benefits can be imposed. The duration ranges from two weeks in the case of insufficient job search efforts up to 12 weeks, e.g. if a benefit recipient refuses to participate in an activation program.

The assessment of such integration agreements was and still is ambivalent (van den Berg et al. 2014). Integration agreements are criticized for being often too standardized and not tailored to

the needs of the particular job seeker. Furthermore, as has been mentioned above, a field experiment for already unemployed individuals showed that integration agreements had in average no impact on their subsequent unemployment rates (van den Berg et al. 2016).

The second element we investigate, the action plan, was developed by the headquarters of the Federal Labor Agency exclusively for the research project. Individuals who registered as job seekers received the action plan form as part of a working package in advance of their initial meeting with a caseworker. They were supposed to use the action plan form to formulate considerations for their integration into the labor market. In detail, the plan was intended to encourage job seekers to develop more specific ideas about their own professional goal, personal strengths and weaknesses, possible qualification needs and suitable search strategies before the initial interview with their placement specialist (see Figure A.2 in Appedix). Such active preparation for the initial interview was intended to increase the feeling of personal responsibility for job search and make job search thus more efficient.

It should be noted that during the time our experiment started, the Federal Employment Agency started to introduce the program “Interne ganzheitliche Integrationsberatung” (Inga) to foster the re-integration of hard-to-place unemployed individuals into the labor market. Inga consisted of an assignment to specialized teams of caseworkers with a reduced caseload that provided intensive in-house placement services. This change in the structure of assignment practices during our intervention period has been taken into account in the design of our experiment.

3 The field experiment

We conducted a field experiment to examine whether the early conclusion of integration agreements and the alternative or supplementary use of action plans have a causal impact on the entry of not-yet unemployed job seekers into unemployment and on further labor market outcomes. In the project, the participating researchers cooperated closely with the responsible department at the headquarters of the Federal Employment Agency and the participating employment agencies. The project took place in five large German labor market agencies (two located in West Germany, three located in East Germany). For these agencies, the project encompassed individuals, who registered personally or by telephone as job seekers from June to November 2013. Only individuals who would be eligible for unemployment benefits when entering unemployment, between the ages of 25 and 65, and without disability should take part in the experiment. Note that workers might of course also register as a job seeker if they do not face the end of an employment relationship. Regrettably, we cannot observe the reason for registering in our data.

Table 1 visualizes the assignment process, which was based on computer program that randomized potential study participants into groups. Randomization was conducted by employees of the Federal Employment Agency in the entry zones of employment agencies for registrations in person and in service centers for registrations by phone. This was necessary as the action plan had to be handed out or sent out to job seekers before the first meeting with a caseworker took place.

During the first meeting with a job seeker, the caseworker in charge was supposed to check the assignment to the four groups by searching for the job seeker's registration number in the database underlying the randomization computer program and to act according to the experimental protocol. IAB conducted short trainings for team leaders in entry zones and service centers as well as for all caseworkers in participating agencies.

Half of the job seekers described above were assigned to four groups that combined variations of the use of integration agreements and action plans. As has been outlined above, an integration agreement is a written and signed agreement between the unemployed and his caseworker on the rights and the duties of the unemployed. Action plans consisted of a form in which jobseekers were supposed to write down potential job strategies and supporting measures, before the first meeting with their caseworker. The variations referred to a) the timing of the integration agreement (immediately after registering as a job seeker or after six months of unemployed) and b) the use of action plans (receipt of a form or no receipt of a form when registering as a job seeker). Each of the four groups encompassed 12.5 percent of registering job seekers. The natural reference group is the group receiving an early integration agreement and no action plan as this mirrors current practice in placement processes in Germany. It is important to note, that caseworkers were instructed to keep all other components of the placement process unchanged, in particular the frequency of meetings and the assignment to active labor market programs.

Individuals assigned to the four groups mentioned above could not take part in the Inga-program for hard-to-place unemployed persons (see Section 2) during the first six months of their unemployment. The remaining second half of registering job seekers were randomly assigned to a group that could enter the Inga-program immediately if caseworkers considered them as hard-to-place. The experimental design thus avoided mixing effects of integration agreements, action plans and Inga, as assignment to Inga could be influenced by using the other elements. If for instance action plans have a positive impact on the motivation of unemployed persons, less of those with an action plan would be profiled as hard-to-place, and less of them could enter Inga.

During the course of the field experiment, colleagues from IAB carried out expert interviews with caseworkers in the participating agencies, with a particular focus on the action plans (see also van den Berg et al. 2018). The interviewed caseworkers mentioned advantages as well as difficulties in the practical use of the instrument. From their point of view, the open questions in the action plan could help jobseekers to reflect on their own work situation, to identify potential difficulties in job search, and to search for suitable solutions already before the first meeting with a caseworker. This could benefit especially people who have to re-orient themselves professionally after longer periods of childcare or illness, but also after stable participation in the labor force. Furthermore, the action plan helps caseworkers to obtain more information about the (labor market) situation of job seekers early, which could benefit the counselling process. However, this information might also be used to the disadvantage of a job seeker, if a person e.g. reveals that she is not willing to take up particular kinds of jobs, which would be reasonable from a legislative viewpoint. The experts also problematized that the action plan, with its focus on the perspective of

jobseekers, could potentially burden the counseling situation. This concerns in particular questions about job seekers' preferences as this question might awaken desires that cannot be met. They also criticize that the action plan - in contrast to the integration agreement - represents only the view of the job seeker, instead of recording the results of a jointly developed and thus binding agreement.

4 Data and balancing

For the basic analysis, we use process generated data made available by the Data and IT Management (DIM) unit of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). We merge the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB V13.01.01 – 190111) with the result of the random assignment tool. The IEB contains anonymized information at the individual level on periods of employment, unemployment, job search, and program participation. Employment spells encompass periods of employment due to social security payments and marginal employment, but not periods of self-employment or as a civil servant. Furthermore, we merge additional variables on the timing of integration agreements (ASU-EEI V06.10.00 – 201804) and on the employment contract (BeH V10.03.00). Furthermore, we merge information from the meeting schedule database of the FEA, which had been directly drawn from the operative systems on a monthly base.

We corrected the original spell data in the following respects: We impute the education variable and replace missing information by valid information from previous (if not available also subsequent) spells. Regarding employment, we do not take into account times of marginal employment and time spent in subsidized employment not due to social security contributions. Furthermore, we drop employment spells with a daily wage rate of less than 5 Euro and replace daily wages above the threshold for social security contributions with this threshold. When computing our outcome variables, we do not take into account those times of registered unemployment where we observe a parallel spell of employment due to social security contributions. Furthermore, we correct not-yet-unemployed job search spells to end as soon as an individual enters unemployment or takes up a new job. The meeting schedule data required some corrections as calendar month and calendar day were partly exchanged (which was obvious as these data came in monthly files). Furthermore, 589 individuals had concluded an integration agreement on a day, for which we find no data in the meeting data base. A plausible interpretation is that individuals were assigned to an immediate meeting (not scheduled beforehand) when registering as a job seeker at the labor market office in person. For these individuals we impute the meeting date according to the date of the integration agreement.

Caseworkers used the randomization tool to assign 25,582 persons to five groups. After merging these with the IEB, we are left with observations for 25,464 persons. Of these, we kept only those who a) were not unemployed yet on the day of the random assignment and b) where the assignment took place at the day of registering as a job seeker or within 7 calendar days. After this step, 17,502 persons remain in our data set. Furthermore, we keep only individuals who were (still) employed on the day of random assignment (15,433 persons left), were of age 25 to 65 on the day

of random assignment (13,768 persons left), were registered as a job-seeker in one of our participating agencies (13,532 persons left), and were registered in the unemployment insurance system, not in the welfare benefit system (13,123 persons left). We drop a few individuals who seem to have registered during an interrupted unemployment spell (13,113 persons left), drop those who had been unemployed or participated in a labor market program during the 30 calendar days preceding the random assignment (13,046 persons left), and finally drop very few individuals with missing information on the sector they worked in previously (13,042 persons left). Of the remaining sample, 6,568 persons were assigned to group 5 that could potentially participate in the Inga-program. Thus our remaining analysis sample contains 6,674 persons who were assigned to the experimental core groups 1 to 4.

Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for these groups. Columns (1) to (4) show mean values for the four treatment groups. About 43 percent of participants are female, and 90 percent are of German nationality; their mean age is 42. The largest share of those registering had previously worked in manufacturing, followed by the trade, maintenance, and repair sector. The mean daily wage (censored at the threshold for social security contributions) in the last job amounted to 65 Euro, about 36 percent of those registering was on a temporary contract, and 24 percent of the job seekers worked in part-time. Over the course of the last five years and measured at the time of randomization, participants were in average for around 3.7 years in employment (due to social security contributions); mean tenure at the last employer was around 2.1 years. 27 percent had experienced a recall (defined as working again at an employer during an interruption of at least 30 days) during that time period. Column (5) of Table 1 displays the results of a test for equality of the 4 group means. The hypothesis of zero differences can be rejected for all variables under consideration at $\alpha = 0.05$. Thus random assignment worked well.

Our main outcome variables are the probabilities to a) exit the state as a not-yet unemployed job-seeker, b) exit the current employment relationship, c) take-up a new job, d) enter unemployment, and e) experience a recall. Recalls are defined as taking up a job at the same employer after an interruption of at least 30 days after the end of the current employment episode. Recalls are an important phenomenon in labor markets and are observed particularly often in the construction sector and in the tourism industry. We measure the probabilities of such transitions until 30, 60, 90, 120, 180, and 360 days since the day of random assignment. At the day of random assignment, each individual in the analyzed sample is registered as a job seeker and still employed. The administrative data do not contain information on the expected end date of the employment relationship at the current employer. In the following, we assume that the job is prolonged, when the job seeker's registration ends while employment at the current firm continues.

In the regression analyses, we use group 3 (late integration agreement) as the reference group. While group 1 (early integration agreement) mirrors the current practice at labor market agencies, group 3 presents the least invasive intervention as individuals received neither an early integration agreement nor an action plan.

Furthermore, in the Appendix we present some results on accumulated days in different labor market states within 30, 60, 90, 120, 180, and 360 days after random assignment, and on the status on these days. We distinguish between days in employed subject to social security contributions (including periods of subsidized employment), days in unsubsidized employment, days in unemployment (including days in labor market programs), and days within labor market programs (short training measures or longer qualification programs).

In addition to the administrative data, we conducted a telephone survey for a subgroup of participants of job seekers assigned to groups 1 to 4. Interviews took part around 6 weeks after randomization, from mid July 2013 until February 2014. All in all, 3,529 individuals participated in the interviews. Of these, 80 percent (2,813 persons) agreed to merge the survey data with administrative data. Merging the data with our chosen sample of persons from the administrative data, we have survey data for 1,413 persons. A regression of survey participation in our sample of 6,474 individuals shows that taking part in the survey is not independent from treatment status (Table A.1 in the Appendix): Taking group 3 (late integration agreement) as the reference group, the participation probability is around five percentage points higher (significant) if individuals were in group 1 (early integration agreement and action plan). Thus while we will partly refer to survey results, they cannot be interpreted in a causal way.

While we do not have administrative data on the expected date of dismissal, quit, or end of contract, we can at least get an impression from the survey data. For this subsample, Figure A.3 presents survivor functions for the expected date of dismissal, quit, or end of their contract (measured since assignment day). The figure shows that only one third of the sample does in fact register three months before the expected end of their employment relationship. Differences across treatment groups cannot be interpreted in a causal way as participation in the survey is probably not independent from the treatment (as discussed above).

5 Compliance

The institutional structure in which our experiment took place presents some challenges in assessing the compliance regarding the experimental protocol. Integration agreements should be concluded during the first meeting in groups 1 and 2 and after 6 months of unemployment in groups 3 and 4. In principle, the first meeting with a caseworker is supposed to take place soon after registering as a job seeker. However, if individuals become unemployed with relatively short notice, the first meeting might be scheduled to a date after unemployment entry. Job seekers would also be able to postpone the first meeting until entering unemployment with good reason (see section 2). Thus the timing of the first meeting varies across individuals. Furthermore, if all individuals would enter unemployment three months after registering, late integration agreements (group 3 and 4) would have to be concluded around nine months after registering. However, many individuals are not aware of a dismissal three months in advance of their unemployment entry (Figure A.3 in the Appendix).

A simple cross-tabulation (Table 3) shows that around two third of those assigned to group 1 and 2 concluded their first integration agreement during their first meeting. However, also around 40 percent of those in group 3 and 4 did so. Furthermore, Table 3 conveys that around 40 percent of those in group 1 and 2 sign their first agreement before entering unemployment, while around 20 percent of those in group 3 and 4 do so. Taking into account also the time of (eventual) unemployment, the share of those concluding an integration agreement increases to around 65 percent for group 1 and 2, and to 50 percent for group 3 and 4 (Table 3).

To get a better impression of the timing of integration agreements, Figure 1 presents Kaplan Meier survivor functions, restricted to those still at risk at any point of time. We censor durations at the time of prolonging the current employment relationship while terminating the registration at a job seeker, at exiting unemployment or at entering a new employment relationship. The figure shows strong differences between those who were supposed to receive an early or a late integration agreement. However, a relatively large share of those who were supposed to sign their integration agreement only after 6 months of unemployment had already concluded an agreement 6 months after randomization (including the time period as a not-yet unemployed registered job-seeker).

All in all, we face incomplete compliance with the experimental protocol, and our later results should be interpreted as intention-to-treat effects. This is probably due to the fact that randomization was carried out in service centers and entry zones. Caseworkers were instructed to check for the assignment result before or during the first meeting with a job seeker, but obviously partly forgot or ignored this requirement. Our estimated effects therefore have to be interpreted as intention-to-treat effects.

To investigate in as far other elements of the placement process also differed by the assignment group, Figure 2 and 3 shows the corresponding survivor functions for the timing of the first meeting with a caseworker and for receipt of the first vacancy referral. Obviously, differences between the curves are much smaller, which is in line with the experimental protocol. Furthermore, the timing of the first meeting strongly resembles the timing of the first integration agreements for groups 1 and 2 with an early integration agreement.

Assessing compliance regarding the action plans also faces some challenges. We have no completely reliable information how many job seekers did indeed fill out the action plan and discussed it with their caseworker. Caseworkers were instructed to lay down in the randomization computer program if job seekers brought a filled out action plan to the first meeting. Only this information is available for all participants in our data set. However, these entries are missing for 79 percent of individuals assigned to group 2 or 4. For the remaining share, caseworkers indicated that 7 percentage points of job seekers filled out the action plan, while 14 percentage points did not. Furthermore, caseworkers were asked to collect filled out action plans and to send them to IAB. We received about 600 action plans, which equals around 9 percent of those assigned to the action plan groups (a quarter of all assignments). Some further descriptive information can be obtained from the survey data, which cover, however, only part of the participants. According to the survey, 27 percent of those assigned to groups 3 and 4 filled out the action plan. 81 percent of those who

filled out the plan brought it to the first meeting, and 63 percent discussed the action plan with their caseworker. Around half of those filling out the action plan said that it helped them to prepare for the meeting and to prepare for job search. All in all, there was obviously a degree of compliance, whose size, however, cannot be determined exactly. Thus regarding the use of action plans, estimated effects have to be interpreted as intention-to-treat effects, too.

6 Average intention-to-treat effects

Our main outcome variables are the probabilities a) to exit the state as a not-yet unemployed job-seeker, b) exit the current employment relationship, c) take-up a new job, d) enter unemployment, and e) experience a recall (after an employment interruption of at least 8 days). Figure 4 to 7 present Kaplan Meier survivor functions for these outcome variables and for the first year after registering as a job seeker (data are not right-censored).

Figure 4 displays the timing of exits from the state of a not-yet unemployed job seeker (either into unemployment, into a new job, or due to other reasons as prolonging an employment relationship). Three months after randomization, only 20 percent of (previous) job seekers are still in this state. There are no obvious differences across the four experimental groups.

Figure 5 shows when job seekers leave their current job: Three months after registering, around one third of job seekers is still employed at the same employer. Afterwards there is a drop in the survivor function which then levels out at slightly less than 20 percent, meaning that one of five job seekers does not leave their current employer within one year after registering as a job seeker. Again, differences between the four experimental groups are rather small.

Figure 6 presents survivor functions of taking-up a new job. Three months after registering, around 20 percent of job seekers have already taken up a new job. The share increases to around 60 percent during the course of a year. Differences across groups are again small.

Figure 7 displays entry rates into unemployment. Within three months after registering, more than half of the job seekers have already entered unemployment. This is in line with the survey finding that many individuals have less than three months in their current job left when learning about an upcoming job loss. Three months after registering, the survivor function drops by a few percentage points, which mirrors the institutional context. Within one year of registering, around one quarter of (previous) job seekers have not entered unemployment yet. Again, survivor functions are very similar across treatment groups.

Figure 8 shows survivor functions for having a recall after an employment interruption of at least 30 days. Since 90 days after assignment, the share of those with a recall steadily increases. Until one year after assignment, 14 percent of all individuals in the sample had experienced a recall. Here we find a slightly higher share of recalls among those assigned to the groups with early integration agreements.

Table 4 presents regression results for the impact of the treatments on the probabilities of transitions from or into these states until day 30, 60, 90, 120, 180, and 360 after random assignment,

controlling for the covariates used in the balancing test (see Table 2). Out of 144 estimated coefficients for the first four outcome variables, only five are significant at conventional levels, and for these we see no obvious pattern. Considering multiple testing issues, we interpret this in the sense that we can hardly interpret this as evidence that our experimental interventions systematically had causal effects. In line with Figure 8, however, we find rather economically substantial effects of early integration agreements (group 1 and 2) of around 2 percentage points on the probability to experience a recall. This might be taken as hint that early integration agreements encourage individuals to intensify negotiations with their current employer to hire them back later.

Estimated covariate effects on the probabilities for day 90 after random assignment (when 80 percent of the individuals in our sample have already left the state of not-yet-unemployed job-seeker) are displayed in Table 5. By far the strongest effect on the analyzed probabilities is found for temporary contracts: Individuals with temporary contracts leave the state of job search as well as their current employer less often, and also take-up less often new jobs or enter unemployment. This is not unexpected as individuals on temporary contracts will often be forced to register three months before the end of their employment relationship, and partly their contract will be prolonged at the current employer. Furthermore, we find that the probabilities to leave each of the states analyzed is lower for women, decrease with wage and with years at the current employer. The latter result is well in line with the institutional fact that the notice period for dismissals increases with tenure, which implies that individuals are forced to register more early as a not-yet unemployed job seeker.

Additionally, Table A.2 in the Appendix examines how job seekers spend their time during the 360 days after randomization. The Table shows treatment effects on accumulated days in employment, unsubsidized employment, unemployment, and active labor market programs on day 30, 60, 90, 120, 180, and 360 after random assignment, also controlling for covariates. Again, only 3 out of 144 estimated coefficients are (weakly) significant. Table A.3 in the Appendix displays covariate effects. Again, we find very strong effects for temporary contracts – during the subsequent year, individuals registering as a job seeker with a temporary contract spend around 1,5 months more in employment and around one month less in unemployment. Also more years in employment go hand in hand with more subsequent days in employment and less days in unemployment.

Table A.4 and Table A.5 display the corresponding information for the labor market status at specific dates after random assignment. We find some significant effects around day 120 after random assignment, where the share of individuals in employment is 3 to 4 percentage points higher among those receiving an early integration agreement. However, this effect is restricted to this specific date. With respect to the covariate effects on the labor market status one year after the assignment took place, we also find strong positive effects of being in a temporary contract at the time of registering as unemployed on being employed one year later. The share in employment also increases with years in employment and years with unemployment benefits during the last years.

7 Heterogeneous effects by risk of entering unemployment

A main objective of early activation is to prevent still employed workers entering unemployment. Even if we find in average few treatment effects of early integration agreements, they might still work for those with a particularly high risk of entering unemployment.

To analyze this topic further, we use a sample of individuals who registered as a job seeker within the same agencies during June to November 2012 (one year before our experiment took place). Note that the macroeconomic environment was very similar in both years, 2012 and 2013. We apply restriction mirroring those from the experiment. For the resulting sample of registering individuals, we estimate a Gompertz model and predict the individual median duration until entering unemployment out of sample for our experimental group. We then distinguish those with a predicted median duration until entering unemployment of less equal and more than 90 days (as Figure 7 shows, more than half of all workers have entered unemployment until then, while few do afterwards).

The results are displayed in Table 6 and 7. In line with the predictions, the share of those who had entered unemployment at each point in time is substantially higher within the group who was predicted to enter unemployment earlier. While we find not many systematic treatment effects, the results show that the effects of early integration agreements on recalls are particularly driven by the group of those who are predicted to have a high risk of entering unemployment. During the first year after registration, the effect has the size of 5 to 6 percentage points, which is economically quite substantial (compared to a base rate of around 27 percent). This group also experiences around four times as much recalls as individuals predicted not to enter unemployment within 90 days. However, higher recall transitions do not transfer to any differences in accumulated outcomes as days in employment and unemployment or being in a particular labor market status at a specific date after random assignment. (Table A.6 to A.9 in the Appendix).

8 Conclusions

This paper presents findings on the effectiveness of early integration agreements and action plans for not-yet-unemployed registered job seekers. Integration agreements that are concluded between registered job seekers and their caseworkers are a common tool used in the placement process, Action plans are a simple, short form to be filled out by job seekers already before the first meeting with their caseworker that aims to motivate jobseekers to deal with their strengths and barriers to job search. The experimental design enables us to identify causal effects of these interventions on the risk to leave the state of a not-yet employed job seeker. Thus we focus on a state before entering unemployment and ask if both instruments could have a preventive effect. Due to imperfect compliance, our results have to be interpreted as intention-to-treat-effects.

We find in average no systematic effects of integration agreements and actions plans on the risks to exit the state as a not-yet unemployed job-seeker, exit the current employment relationship, take-up a new job, or enter unemployment. However, we find a slightly higher share of recalls


among those with early integration agreements. This implies that early integration agreements encourage individuals to intensify negotiations with their current employer to hire them back later. This effect is particularly strong for individuals who are predicted to enter unemployment within 90 days after registration as a job seeker. This does not translate, however, in any differences regarding accumulated labor market outcomes. All in all, our results thus shed some doubt on the beneficial effects of early integration agreements and action plans for not-yet unemployed job seekers.

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Figures

Figure 1 Kaplan-Meier estimates of survivor functions until signing the first integration agreement




Notes: IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Register data. N = 6,474.

Log rank test for equality of survivor functions: $\text{Pr}>\chi^2 = 0.00$.

Observations are right-censored at prolonging the current relationship while terminating the registration as a job seeker, at unemployment exit, and at taking-up a new job.

Figure 2 Kaplan-Meier estimates of survivor functions until the first meeting




Notes: IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Register data. N = 6,474.

Log rank test for equality of survivor functions: $\text{Pr}>\chi^2 = 0.95$.


Observations are right-censored at prolonging the current relationship while terminating the registration as a job seeker, at unemployment exit, and at taking-up a new job.

Figure 3 Kaplan-Meier estimates of survivor functions until receiving the first vacancy referral




Notes: IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Register data. N = 6,474.
 Log rank test for equality of survivor functions: $Pr > \chi^2 = 0.62$.
 Observations are right-censored at prolonging the current relationship while terminating the registration as a job seeker, at unemployment exit, and at taking-up a new job.

Figure 4 Kaplan-Meier estimates of survivor functions until exiting the state of a not-yet-unemployed job-seeker




Notes: IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Register data. N = 6,474.
 Log rank test for equality of survivor functions: $Pr > \chi^2 = 0.49$.
 Observations not right-censored.

Figure 5 Kaplan-Meier estimates of survivor functions until exiting the current employment relationship




Notes: IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Register data. N = 6,474.
 Log rank test for equality of survivor functions: Pr>chi2 = 0.30.
 Observations not right-censored.

Figure 6 Kaplan-Meier estimates of survivor functions until taking-up a new job




Notes: IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Register data. N = 6,474.
 Log rank test for equality of survivor functions: Pr>chi2 = 0.47.
 Observations not right-censored.

Figure 7 Kaplan-Meier estimates of survivor functions until entering unemployment



Notes: IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Register data. N = 6,474.
Log rank test for equality of survivor functions: Pr>chi2 = 0.63.
Observations not right-censored.

Figure 9 Kaplan-Meier estimates of survivor functions until recall



Notes: IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Register data. N = 6,474.
Log rank test for equality of survivor functions: Pr>chi2 = 0.28.
Observations not right-censored.

Tables

Table 1 Experimental groups and assignment shares (in parenthesis)

	No action plan as part of working package	Action plan as part of working package
Early integration agreement during first meeting after registration	Group 1 (12.5%)	Group 2 (12.5%)
Late integration agreement during month 6 of unemployment	Group 3 (12.5%)	Group 4 (12.5%)

Note: Individuals assigned to group 1 to 4 were not able to participate in the Inga-program during their first 6 months of unemployment. Half of all potential participants were assigned to a fifth group were individuals could receive a special intervention for hard-to-place unemployed persons after unemployment entry.

Table 2 Balancing - means of observed characteristics for the four experimental groups and test on equal means

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Early IA	Early IA + AP	Late IA	Late IA + AP	p-value [#]
Gender (1=female)	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	1.00
Nationality (1=foreign)	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	1.00
Age	42	42	42	42	0.57
<i>Education</i>					
No occupational degree	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.88
Occupational degree	0.77	0.79	0.78	0.79	0.67
University degree	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.60
<i>Labor market agency</i>					
A	0.24	0.22	0.23	0.21	0.27
B	0.28	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.24
C	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.29
D	0.14	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.41
E	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.22	0.81
<i>Characteristics last job</i>					
Daily wage during last job	66	65	66	64	0.51
Temporary contract	0.35	0.36	0.37	0.36	0.51
Part-time in last job	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	1.00
<i>Sector last job</i>					
Agriculture, fishing, mining	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.46
Manufacturing	0.15	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.38
Energy, water, waste	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.39
Construction	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.91
Trade, maintenance, repair	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.81
Transport and storage	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.65
Hospitality	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.03
Information and communication	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.92
Financial and insurance services	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.64
Real estate activities	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.17
Scientific and technical services	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.22
Other business services	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.40
Public administration, defense	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.54
Education	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.62
Health and social care	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.19
Art, Entertainment and Recreation	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.71
Other services, private households	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.26
Temporary agency work	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.38
<i>Position in last job</i>					
Helper	0.20	0.22	0.20	0.22	0.20
Professional	0.60	0.59	0.60	0.59	0.93
Complex specialist	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.76
Highly complex	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.41
<i>Employment history last 5 years</i>					
Share of years in employment	3.79	3.74	3.70	3.72	0.17
Share of years with last employer	2.13	2.09	2.02	1.99	0.06
Share of years in unemployment	0.49	0.52	0.54	0.52	0.11
Share of years with unemployment benefits	0.34	0.36	0.37	0.38	0.19
Share of years with welfare benefit receipt	0.38	0.39	0.42	0.41	0.48
Recall (1 = yes)	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.26	0.70
Active labor market program (1 = yes)	0.25	0.26	0.26	0.27	0.66
Number of observations	1649	1560	1657	1608	

Notes: IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Register data. #) F-test on equality of means.

Table 3 **Timing of integration agreements**

	Early IA	AP + early IA	Late IA	AP + late IA
IA at date of first meeting (share)	0.67	0.66	0.39	0.39
IA while not-yet unemployed (share)	0.41	0.39	0.22	0.19
IA until end of unemployment (share)	0.66	0.64	0.51	0.48
Days until IA (median)	34	31	83	100
Observations	1649	1560	1657	1608
Observations with IA	1307	1223	1155	1105

Notes: IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Register data.

Table 4 Effects of the treatment on the probabilities of exits and transitions until day 30, 60, 90, 120, 180, 360 after random assignment

Exit from the state as a not-yet-unemployed job seeker until day...						
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.016 (0.016)	0.004 (0.015)	0.001 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.009)	0.007 (0.006)	0.002 (0.002)
Early IA + AP	0.026 (0.016)	0.004 (0.015)	0.023* (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	0.004 (0.006)	0.000 (0.002)
Late IA + AP	0.010 (0.016)	0.002 (0.015)	0.005 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.009)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.002)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.408*** (0.012)	0.640*** (0.012)	0.774*** (0.010)	0.934*** (0.006)	0.968*** (0.004)	0.995*** (0.002)
Exit from the current employment relationship until day...						
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.005 (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.028** (0.014)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.011)
Early IA + AP	0.016 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.015)	0.006 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.014)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.012)
Late IA + AP	0.014 (0.015)	0.006 (0.015)	0.018 (0.015)	0.000 (0.014)	0.006 (0.013)	0.009 (0.012)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.363*** (0.012)	0.569*** (0.012)	0.648*** (0.012)	0.788*** (0.010)	0.823*** (0.009)	0.860*** (0.009)
Transition into a new job until day...						
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.022*** (0.007)	-0.020* (0.012)	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.016)	-0.016 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.016)
Early IA + AP	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.012)	0.009 (0.014)	0.022 (0.016)	0.018 (0.017)	0.000 (0.016)
Late IA + AP	-0.015* (0.007)	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.016)	0.000 (0.017)	0.010 (0.016)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.059*** (0.005)	0.145*** (0.008)	0.223*** (0.010)	0.307*** (0.011)	0.438*** (0.012)	0.633*** (0.012)
Transition into unemployment until day...						
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.008 (0.015)	0.007 (0.016)	0.004 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.016)	0.001 (0.015)	0.001 (0.015)
Early IA + AP	0.012 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)
Late IA + AP	0.014 (0.015)	0.010 (0.016)	0.017 (0.016)	0.000 (0.016)	0.001 (0.015)	0.013 (0.015)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.292*** (0.011)	0.470*** (0.012)	0.537*** (0.012)	0.655*** (0.012)	0.694*** (0.011)	0.730*** (0.011)
Recall until day...						
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.590 (1.022)	0.000 (0.000)	0.005* (0.003)	0.011** (0.005)	0.019*** (0.007)	0.014* (0.009)
Early IA + AP	-0.715 (1.036)	0.000 (0.000)	0.004 (0.003)	0.010** (0.005)	0.013* (0.007)	0.015* (0.009)
Late IA + AP	1.041 (1.029)	0.000 (0.000)	0.002 (0.003)	0.009* (0.005)	0.009 (0.007)	0.004 (0.009)
Constant from model w/o covariates	-1.201 (0.852)	0.005** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.037*** (0.005)	0.083*** (0.007)	0.130*** (0.009)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Results from a linear probability model. Standard errors in parentheses. IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Reference group = group 3 with late IA. Further controls: Variables from Table 2 (age in 4 age groups) and month of assignment. N = 6,464.

Table 5 Effects of selected covariates on the treatment on exits and transitions until day 90 after random assignment

	Exit from ...		Transition into ...		Recall
	not-yet-unemployed job search	current employment	new job	unemployment	
<i>Treatment group</i>					
Early IA	0.001 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.014)	0.004 (0.016)	0.011** (0.005)
Early IA + AP	0.023* (0.014)	0.006 (0.015)	0.009 (0.014)	0.013 (0.016)	0.010** (0.005)
Late IA + AP	0.005 (0.013)	0.018 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.014)	0.017 (0.016)	0.009* (0.005)
<i>Gender and nationality</i>					
Gender (1=female)	-0.064*** (0.011)	-0.089*** (0.012)	-0.035*** (0.012)	-0.081*** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.004)
Nationality (1=foreign)	0.016 (0.018)	0.006 (0.020)	-0.034* (0.019)	0.018 (0.021)	-0.009 (0.007)
<i>Age group (reference 25-34)</i>					
35-44	0.011 (0.023)	0.030 (0.026)	-0.029 (0.024)	0.032 (0.027)	0.011 (0.008)
45-54	-0.002 (0.016)	0.038** (0.018)	-0.020 (0.017)	0.043** (0.019)	-0.005 (0.006)
55 and older	-0.008 (0.013)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.019 (0.016)	0.010** (0.005)
<i>Education (reference: occupational degree)</i>					
No occupational degree	0.011 (0.023)	0.030 (0.026)	-0.029 (0.024)	0.032 (0.027)	0.011 (0.008)
University degree	-0.002 (0.016)	0.038** (0.018)	-0.020 (0.017)	0.043** (0.019)	-0.005 (0.006)
<i>Characteristics last job</i>					
Daily wage during last job	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Temporary contract	-0.177*** (0.011)	-0.306*** (0.012)	-0.108*** (0.012)	-0.261*** (0.013)	-0.005 (0.004)
Part time	-0.022* (0.013)	-0.046*** (0.014)	-0.017 (0.014)	-0.044*** (0.015)	0.003 (0.005)
<i>Employment history last 5 years</i>					
Share of years in employment	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.006)	0.028*** (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.006)	0.001 (0.002)
Share of years with last employer	-0.035*** (0.004)	-0.028*** (0.004)	-0.036*** (0.004)	-0.031*** (0.004)	-0.002* (0.001)
Share of years in unemployment	0.006 (0.013)	0.014 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.014)	0.021 (0.015)	0.004 (0.005)
Share of years with unemployment benefits	-0.022 (0.015)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.016 (0.016)	0.020 (0.018)	-0.000 (0.005)
Share of years with welfare benefit receipt	-0.004 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.004 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.003)
Recall (1 = yes)	-0.042*** (0.012)	-0.045*** (0.013)	-0.032*** (0.012)	-0.018 (0.014)	0.046*** (0.004)
Active labor market program (1 = yes)	0.009 (0.013)	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.013)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.011** (0.005)
R-squared	0.138	0.055	0.067	0.178	0.062

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Results from a linear probability model. Standard errors in parentheses. IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Reference group = group 3 with late IA. Further controls: Labor market agency, sectoral affiliation, position in last job (see Table 2), and month of assignment. N = 6,464.

Table 6 Effects of the treatment on the probabilities of exits and transitions until day 30, 60, 90, 120, 180, 360 after random assignment for those predicted *not* to enter unemployment within 90 days

Exit from the state as a not-yet-unemployed job seeker until day...						
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.012 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.020* (0.011)	0.004 (0.008)	0.001 (0.003)
Early IA + AP	0.009 (0.019)	-0.008 (0.020)	0.023 (0.018)	-0.000 (0.012)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.003)
Late IA + AP	0.012 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.005 (0.017)	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.003)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.344*** (0.014)	0.567*** (0.015)	0.728*** (0.013)	0.922*** (0.008)	0.962*** (0.006)	0.995*** (0.002)
Exit from the current employment relationship until day...						
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.036** (0.018)	-0.013 (0.016)	0.003 (0.015)
Early IA + AP	0.004 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.019)	0.008 (0.019)	-0.027 (0.018)	-0.016 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.015)
Late IA + AP	0.017 (0.018)	0.007 (0.019)	0.023 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.018)	0.009 (0.017)	0.012 (0.015)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.290*** (0.013)	0.476*** (0.015)	0.568*** (0.014)	0.739*** (0.013)	0.777*** (0.012)	0.822*** (0.011)
Transition into a new job until day...						
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.023*** (0.009)	-0.027** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.016)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.020)	-0.013 (0.020)
Early IA + AP	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.019 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.020)	-0.008 (0.020)
Late IA + AP	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.019)	0.010 (0.020)	0.011 (0.020)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.057*** (0.006)	0.145*** (0.010)	0.219*** (0.012)	0.292*** (0.013)	0.392*** (0.014)	0.583*** (0.014)
Transition into unemployment until day...						
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.002 (0.017)	0.007 (0.019)	0.004 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.019)
Early IA + AP	0.000 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.019)	0.012 (0.020)	-0.009 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.020)	0.000 (0.019)
Late IA + AP	0.019 (0.017)	0.012 (0.019)	0.022 (0.020)	0.001 (0.020)	0.002 (0.020)	0.013 (0.019)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.225*** (0.012)	0.374*** (0.014)	0.450*** (0.015)	0.584*** (0.014)	0.628*** (0.014)	0.671*** (0.014)
Recall until day...						
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.000 (0.000)	0.004 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.012** (0.005)	0.009 (0.007)	0.013 (0.009)
Early IA + AP	0.000 (0.000)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.008)	0.004 (0.010)
Late IA + AP	0.000 (0.000)	0.002 (0.003)	0.009** (0.004)	0.009* (0.005)	0.006 (0.007)	0.011 (0.009)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.000 (0.000)	0.002 (0.002)	0.006** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.033*** (0.005)	0.071*** (0.008)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Results from a linear probability model. Standard errors in parentheses. IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Reference group = group 3 with late IA. Further controls: Variables from Table 2 (age in 4 age groups) and month of assignment. N = 4,579.

Table 7 Effects of the treatment on the probabilities of exits and transitions until day 30, 60, 90, 120, 180, 360 after random assignment for those predicted to enter unemployment within 90 days


Exit from the state as a not-yet-unemployed job seeker until day...						
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.018 (0.029)	0.005 (0.022)	0.006 (0.018)	0.013 (0.010)	0.014** (0.006)	0.007** (0.003)
Early IA + AP	0.056* (0.029)	0.022 (0.022)	0.018 (0.018)	0.011 (0.010)	0.010 (0.006)	0.007** (0.003)
Late IA + AP	-0.006 (0.029)	0.006 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.018)	0.013 (0.010)	0.009 (0.006)	0.004 (0.003)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.559*** (0.022)	0.812*** (0.017)	0.882*** (0.014)	0.961*** (0.007)	0.982*** (0.004)	0.994*** (0.002)
Exit from the current employment relationship until day...						
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.014 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.024)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.000 (0.018)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.014)
Early IA + AP	0.036 (0.030)	-0.006 (0.024)	0.003 (0.022)	0.005 (0.018)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.014)
Late IA + AP	-0.001 (0.029)	-0.000 (0.024)	0.005 (0.022)	0.015 (0.018)	0.008 (0.016)	0.009 (0.014)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.535*** (0.022)	0.790*** (0.018)	0.837*** (0.016)	0.906*** (0.013)	0.931*** (0.011)	0.951*** (0.010)
Transition into a new job until day...						
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.019 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.022)	0.009 (0.027)	0.022 (0.030)	-0.006 (0.031)	0.010 (0.027)
Early IA + AP	-0.017 (0.014)	0.017 (0.022)	0.039 (0.027)	0.071** (0.030)	0.059* (0.031)	0.019 (0.027)
Late IA + AP	-0.018 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.018 (0.027)	-0.028 (0.030)	-0.028 (0.031)	0.013 (0.027)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.065*** (0.010)	0.147*** (0.016)	0.233*** (0.019)	0.343*** (0.022)	0.545*** (0.022)	0.753*** (0.019)
Transition into unemployment until day...						
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.013 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.028)	0.006 (0.026)	0.009 (0.024)	0.019 (0.022)	0.013 (0.021)
Early IA + AP	0.036 (0.031)	0.012 (0.028)	0.019 (0.026)	0.009 (0.024)	0.012 (0.022)	0.017 (0.021)
Late IA + AP	-0.006 (0.030)	0.000 (0.027)	0.002 (0.026)	0.005 (0.024)	0.007 (0.022)	0.021 (0.021)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.451*** (0.023)	0.700*** (0.020)	0.745*** (0.019)	0.822*** (0.017)	0.851*** (0.016)	0.869*** (0.015)
Recall until day...						
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.000 (0.000)	0.007 (0.008)	0.023* (0.014)	0.034* (0.019)	0.027 (0.023)	0.065*** (0.024)
Early IA + AP	0.000 (0.000)	0.010 (0.008)	0.029** (0.014)	0.034* (0.019)	0.043* (0.023)	0.049** (0.024)
Late IA + AP	0.000 (0.000)	0.002 (0.008)	0.011 (0.013)	0.008 (0.019)	0.003 (0.022)	0.011 (0.023)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.000 (0.000)	0.010* (0.006)	0.031*** (0.010)	0.094*** (0.015)	0.196*** (0.019)	0.267*** (0.021)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Results from a linear probability model. Standard errors in parentheses. IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Reference group = group 3 with late IA. Further controls: Variables from Table 2 (age in 4 age groups) and month of assignment. N = 1,895.

Appendix A (for online publication)

Figure A.1 Example for an integration agreement

Ziel-/Eingliederungsvereinbarung  Bundesagentur für Arbeit
Agentur für Arbeit

zwischen

und

Rights

Es werden aufgrund der Zielsetzung nachfolgende Aktivitäten bis zum nächsten Termin verbindlich vereinbart

Zielsetzung	Nächster Termin am
Aufnahme einer Tätigkeit als Physiotherapeutin durch bundesweite Arbeitsplatzsuche	Spätestens nach 2 Monaten (entsprechend KKK)

Vereinbarte Aktivitäten des Kunden bis zum nächsten Termin

- Überprüfen Sie Ihr soeben erstelltes und veröffentlichtes Bewerberprofil unter www.arbeitsagentur.de mit der Referenznummer ...
- Informieren Sie sich im Internet über die richtige Bewerbungsstrategie (z.B. www.bewerbungsdschun-gel.de).
- Erstellen Sie einen Qualifizierungsplan mit den Inhalten, die Ihnen nach Ihrer persönlichen Einschätzung zur erfolgreichen Berufsausübung fehlen und leiten mir diesen per Mail bis zum ... (1 Woche) zu.
- Bewerben Sie sich bundesweit als Physiotherapeutin auf mindestens 10 ausgeschriebene Stellen pro Monat.
- Bieten Sie bei Ihren Bewerbungen ein Einarbeitungs-/Qualifizierungspraktikum von bis zu 8 Wochen an. Melden Sie sich vor Beginn des Praktikums telefonisch im Service Center (Tel.-Nr.: ...), damit wir die erforderlichen Formalitäten erledigen können.
- Erstellen Sie bis zum nächsten Beratungsgespräch einen Aktionsplan, welche weiteren Aktivitäten Sie bis wann unternehmen wollen, um Ihre Arbeitslosigkeit zu beenden und bringen ihn zum Gespräch mit.
- Nutzen Sie auch weiterhin das Angebot von Jobbörsen im Internet, zum Beispiel unter www.arbeitsagentur.de - Informationen für Arbeitnehmer - Arbeitsuche - Arbeitsmarktportal.
- Bitte führen Sie eine Gesamtübersicht über Ihre Bewerbungsaktivitäten und senden Sie mir diese monatlich per Mail zu (E-Mail-Adresse) oder geben Sie diese in der Eingangszone der Agentur für Arbeit ab. Datum der Bewerbung, Unternehmen, Art der Bewerbung und Stand sollten aus der Gesamtübersicht hervorgehen (siehe Beispielübersicht in der „Job-Profi-Mappe“). Erster Termin ist der ...
- Bitte bringen Sie zu allen persönlichen Beratungsgesprächen mit Ihrem Vermittler die aktualisierte schriftliche Gesamtübersicht über Ihre Bewerbungsaktivitäten mit.

Duties

• Bitte teilen Sie uns unbedingt sofort mit, wenn sich Ihre Adresse, E-Mailadresse, Telefonnummer oder Handynummer ändert. Denn wir rufen Sie an, wenn wir passende Stellen für Sie haben!

Aktivitäten der Agentur für Arbeit

- Wir veröffentlichen Ihr Bewerberprofil im Internet unter www.arbeitsagentur.de. Sie finden es unter der Referenznummer ... (Pfad: Arbeitgeber – Bewerber suchen – Referenznummersuche).
- Sollten wir für Sie passende Stellen als Physiotherapeutin haben, rufen wir Sie an. In Einzelfällen senden wir Ihnen auch direkt ein Stellenangebot zu.
- Wir unterstützen Sie finanziell während eines selbst gesuchten Praktikums im Rahmen einer „betrieblichen Trainingsmaßnahme“ (max. 8 Wochen).
- Unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen können finanzielle Unterstützungen, wie z.B. Bewerbungen, Reisekosten zu Vorstellungsgesprächen innerhalb der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gewährt werden.
- Die Internetarbeitsplätze sind während folgender Öffnungszeiten ... in der Agentur für Arbeit ... (z.B. im Berufsinformationszentrum...) kostenlos nutzbar. Hier können Sie auch Bewerbungen schreiben und ausdrucken.

Die Ziel-/Eingliederungsvereinbarung wurde mit mir besprochen, ein Exemplar habe ich erhalten. Ich verpflichte mich, die vereinbarten Aktivitäten einzuhalten und beim nächsten Termin über die Ergebnisse zu berichten.

Datum

Unterschrift des Kunden / der Kundin Unterschrift des Vermittlers / der Vermittlerin

Signatures

Translation into English:

Objective: Taking up employment as a physio-therapist through nationwide job search

Next appointment: After 2 months at the latest

Bindingly agreed activities of the customer until the next appointment:

- Check your recently created and published profile at www.arbeitsagentur.de with the reference number,
- Inform yourself about application strategies on the internet (e.g. www.bewerbungsdschun-gel.de),
- Create a qualification plan with the contents, which are in your opinion missing for a successful integration and send it to me by mail until (...),
- Apply nationwide as a physio-therapist for at least 10 vacancies per month.
- In your applications, offer to work as a training- qualification intern for up to 8 weeks. Before starting the internship, contact the service center by phone (...), so we can complete all required formalities.
- Until the next consultation create an action plan, which includes how and until when you want to undertake other activities to quit unemployment and bring this to the consultation.
- Continue using internet job search engines, for example at www.arbeitsagentur.de.

- Please conduct an overview on your application activities and send it to me by e-mail every month or leave it in the entrance zone of the labor market agency. The overview should contain the date of application, the organization, the kind of application and the state of the application (you find an example at ...). The first date for this is (...).
- To all personal consultations, please bring with you the actual complete overview of your application activities.
- If your address, e-Mail, phone number or mobile phone number changes, please let us know as soon as possible. We will call you when we have found an appropriate vacancy.

Activities of the labor market agency:

- We publish your applicant profile on the internet at www.arbeitsagentur.de. You will find it under the reference number (...)
- Should we have found an appropriate vacancy for a physio-therapist for you, we will call you. In single cases we directly send you a job offer.
- we support you financially during your internship in a company-based training program (max. 8 weeks).
- Under certain conditions, financial support can be granted, e.g. for applications, travel expenses for personal interviews within Germany.
- Computers can be used free of charge in the labor market agency during the following opening hours (...). Here you can also write and print your applications.

The integration agreement was discussed with me and I received a copy. I undertake complying with the agreed activities and reporting the results at the next consultation.

Figure A.2 The action plan

Nicht ~~WARTEN~~ sondern **STARTEN**

Gehen Sie mit Plan auf Jobsuche!

Ausfüll-Beispiel auf der Rückseite!

Ich suche eine Stelle als _____

Das zeichnet mich aus

- _____
- _____
- _____

Das ist mir bei der neuen Stelle besonders wichtig

Abstriche würde ich dafür machen bei...

- _____
- _____
- _____

Das könnte meine Arbeitssuche erschweren

▼

Wie gehe ich damit um? Was kann ich ändern?

- _____
- _____
- _____

Meine nächsten Schritte (z.B. Wie oft will ich nach Stellen suchen? Und wo? Wer kann mir helfen?)

- _____
- _____
- _____
- _____
- _____
- _____
- _____
- _____


Translation into English:

Don't WAIT, but **START**
Search for your job with a plan!
Please bring this to your first meeting
Example on the back side!

I look for a job as a ...
This distinguishes me ...
This is important for me at my new job ...
I would make concessions regarding...
This could hinder my job search activities...
How do I work on that? Can I change that? ...
My next steps (e.g. How often will I look for a new job? Where? Who can help me?)

My job is to find a job!

Figure A.3 Kaplan-Meier estimates of survivor functions until the expected date of dismissal, quit, or end of contract



Notes: IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Survey data. N = 1,162. Only individuals participating in the survey who indicate a job search start within a 30-day-window around the assignment days and providing a date about the expected date of their employment relationship after the assignment day. Observations not right-censored.

Table A.1 Effects of the treatment on survey participation

Early IA	0.014 (0.014)
Early IA + AP	0.049*** (0.015)
Late IA + AP	0.001 (0.014)
Constant	0.203*** (0.010)
Observations	6,474
R-squared	0.002

Notes: Results from linear probability model. Standard errors in parentheses. IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Reference group = group 3 with late IA.

Table A.2 Effects of the treatment on accumulated days in states until 30, 60, 90, 120, 180, and 360 days after random assignment

	Accumulated days in employment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.058 (0.269)	-0.294 (0.613)	-0.330 (0.980)	0.451 (1.320)	1.240 (2.009)	1.629 (4.035)
Early IA + AP	-0.204 (0.273)	-0.268 (0.622)	-0.306 (0.994)	0.486 (1.338)	1.778 (2.037)	4.189 (4.093)
Late IA + AP	-0.121 (0.271)	-0.862 (0.617)	-1.517 (0.987)	-1.761 (1.328)	-1.908 (2.022)	-2.645 (4.062)
Constant from model w/o covariates	25.455*** (0.201)	43.640*** (0.480)	60.646*** (0.769)	75.712*** (1.018)	107.865*** (1.500)	225.101*** (2.964)
	Accumulated days in unsubsidized employment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.090 (0.271)	-0.215 (0.616)	-0.183 (0.985)	0.722 (1.326)	1.673 (2.019)	2.170 (4.066)
Early IA + AP	-0.168 (0.275)	-0.245 (0.625)	-0.314 (0.999)	0.478 (1.345)	1.651 (2.047)	3.831 (4.123)
Late IA + AP	-0.060 (0.273)	-0.798 (0.620)	-1.516 (0.992)	-1.799 (1.335)	-2.081 (2.032)	-2.893 (4.092)
Constant from model w/o covariates	25.372*** (0.202)	43.479*** (0.483)	60.361*** (0.772)	75.211*** (1.022)	106.946*** (1.506)	222.645*** (2.988)
	Accumulated days in unemployment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.075 (0.260)	0.503 (0.599)	0.735 (0.959)	0.418 (1.290)	0.196 (1.934)	-0.881 (3.536)
Early IA + AP	0.123 (0.264)	0.217 (0.607)	0.146 (0.972)	-0.464 (1.308)	-1.270 (1.961)	-4.722 (3.586)
Late IA + AP	0.009 (0.262)	0.534 (0.603)	0.858 (0.965)	1.110 (1.298)	1.186 (1.947)	-0.470 (3.559)
Constant from model w/o covariates	4.157*** (0.193)	14.698*** (0.465)	26.113*** (0.745)	38.733*** (0.985)	61.172*** (1.431)	105.037*** (2.574)
	Accumulated days in active labor market programs on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.024 (0.023)	0.058 (0.091)	0.161 (0.182)	0.196 (0.278)	0.105 (0.484)	-0.590 (1.022)
Early IA + AP	-0.027 (0.023)	-0.141 (0.092)	-0.102 (0.184)	-0.198 (0.282)	-0.506 (0.491)	-0.715 (1.036)
Late IA + AP	-0.016 (0.023)	-0.051 (0.092)	0.069 (0.183)	0.265 (0.280)	0.524 (0.487)	1.041 (1.029)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.068*** (0.016)	0.417*** (0.064)	0.873*** (0.128)	1.483*** (0.197)	3.024*** (0.342)	7.421*** (0.723)

Notes: Results from an OLS model. Standard errors in parentheses. IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Reference group = group 3 with late IA. Further controls: Variables from Table 2 (age in 4 age groups) and month of assignment. N = 6,464.

Table A.3 Effects of selected covariates on the treatment on accumulated days until day 360 after random assignment

	Accumulated days in ...			
	employment	unsubsidized employment	unemployment	labor market programs
<i>Treatment group</i>				
Early IA	1.629 (4.035)	2.170 (4.066)	-0.881 (3.536)	-0.590 (1.022)
Early IA + AP	4.189 (4.093)	3.831 (4.123)	-4.722 (3.586)	-0.715 (1.036)
Late IA + AP	-2.645 (4.062)	-2.893 (4.092)	-0.470 (3.559)	1.041 (1.029)
<i>Gender and nationality</i>				
Gender (1=female)	10.872*** (3.366)	10.544*** (3.391)	-7.487** (2.949)	-1.201 (0.852)
Nationality (1=foreign)	-11.229** (5.455)	-10.339* (5.496)	6.018 (4.780)	1.411 (1.381)
<i>Age group (reference 25-34)</i>				
35-44	-20.157*** (6.963)	-19.707*** (7.015)	16.579*** (6.101)	-1.154 (1.763)
45-54	-11.376** (4.848)	-11.689** (4.884)	12.210*** (4.248)	2.180* (1.228)
55 and older	-4.674 (4.009)	-4.926 (4.039)	7.705** (3.512)	0.549 (1.015)
<i>Education (reference: occupational degree)</i>				
No occupational degree	-20.157*** (6.963)	-19.707*** (7.015)	16.579*** (6.101)	-1.154 (1.763)
University degree	-11.376** (4.848)	-11.689** (4.884)	12.210*** (4.248)	2.180* (1.228)
<i>Characteristics last job</i>				
Daily wage during last job	0.121** (0.060)	0.136** (0.061)	-0.093* (0.053)	-0.021 (0.015)
Temporary contract	42.083*** (3.361)	43.077*** (3.386)	-31.159*** (2.945)	-1.626* (0.851)
Part time	-4.349 (3.928)	-2.939 (3.957)	0.814 (3.442)	-0.740 (0.995)
<i>Employment history last 5 years</i>				
Share of years in employment	13.657*** (1.516)	13.737*** (1.528)	-7.192*** (1.329)	0.034 (0.384)
Share of years with last employer	-5.064*** (1.090)	-5.003*** (1.098)	4.180*** (0.955)	0.677** (0.276)
Share of years in unemployment	-1.349 (3.877)	-1.166 (3.906)	4.241 (3.397)	0.412 (0.982)
Share of years with unemployment benefits	1.088 (4.476)	1.224 (4.510)	1.484 (3.922)	-0.756 (1.134)
Share of years with welfare benefit receipt	-4.444* (2.293)	-4.918** (2.310)	5.652*** (2.009)	-0.038 (0.581)
Recall (1 = yes)	8.119** (3.530)	9.570*** (3.557)	-6.684** (3.093)	-2.900*** (0.894)
Active labor market program (1 = yes)	-1.101 (3.849)	-1.230 (3.878)	4.255 (3.373)	0.682 (0.975)
R-squared	0.095	0.178	0.152	0.115

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Results from an OLS model. Standard errors in parentheses. IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Reference group = group 3 with late IA. Further controls: Labor market agency, sectoral affiliation, position in last job (see Table 2) and month of assignment. N = 6,464.

**Table A.4 Effects of the treatment on being in a particular state
30, 60, 90, 120, 180, and 360 days after random assignment**

	Share in employment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.025*	-0.006	0.012	0.032*	0.003	-0.006
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Early IA + AP	-0.018	0.002	0.006	0.038**	0.019	0.000
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Late IA + AP	-0.027*	-0.017	-0.018	0.001	-0.008	-0.005
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.697***	0.573***	0.558***	0.491***	0.572***	0.699***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
	Share in unsubsidized employment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.023	-0.004	0.014	0.036**	0.005	-0.008
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Early IA + AP	-0.017	0.002	0.005	0.039**	0.015	0.000
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Late IA + AP	-0.025	-0.019	-0.021	0.000	-0.012	-0.005
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.695***	0.570***	0.553***	0.483***	0.565***	0.690***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
	Share in unemployment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.028*	0.019	-0.002	-0.016	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Early IA + AP	0.020	-0.005	-0.006	-0.027	-0.014	-0.012
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Late IA + AP	0.021	0.009	0.014	-0.002	-0.001	-0.006
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.273***	0.376***	0.380***	0.424***	0.335***	0.179***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)
	Share in a labor market program on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.004	-0.007	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Early IA + AP	0.001	-0.007*	-0.002	0.000	-0.008	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Late IA + AP	0.000	-0.003	0.009*	0.009*	0.003	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.004**	0.016***	0.018***	0.020***	0.030***	0.021***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)

Notes: Results from an OLS model. Standard errors in parentheses. IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Reference group = group 3 with late IA. Further controls: Variables from Table 2 (age in 4 age groups) and month of assignment. N = 6,464.

Table A.5 Effects of selected covariates on the treatment on being in a particular state on day 360 after random assignment

	Share in...			
	employment	unsubsidized employment	unemployment	labor market programs
<i>Treatment group</i>				
Early IA	-0.006 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.005)
Early IA + AP	0.000 (0.016)	0.000 (0.016)	-0.012 (0.013)	0.001 (0.005)
Late IA + AP	-0.005 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.005)
<i>Gender and nationality</i>				
Gender (1=female)	0.012 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.000 (0.011)	-0.009** (0.004)
Nationality (1=foreign)	-0.038* (0.021)	-0.040* (0.021)	0.032* (0.017)	0.005 (0.007)
<i>Age group (reference 25-34)</i>				
35-44	-0.043 (0.027)	-0.045* (0.027)	0.034 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.008)
45-54	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.028 (0.019)	0.030** (0.016)	0.004 (0.006)
55 and older	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.023* (0.013)	0.004 (0.005)
<i>Education (reference: occupational degree)</i>				
No occupational degree	-0.043 (0.027)	-0.045* (0.027)	0.034 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.008)
University degree	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.028 (0.019)	0.030** (0.016)	0.004 (0.006)
<i>Characteristics last job</i>				
Daily wage during last job	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Temporary contract	0.082*** (0.013)	0.085*** (0.013)	-0.038*** (0.011)	0.002 (0.004)
Part time	-0.041*** (0.015)	-0.035** (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.005)
<i>Employment history last 5 years</i>				
Share of years in employment	0.043*** (0.006)	0.044*** (0.006)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.001 (0.002)
Share of years with last employer	-0.027*** (0.004)	-0.028*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.003)	0.004*** (0.001)
Share of years in unemployment	-0.002 (0.015)	0.001 (0.015)	0.018 (0.012)	0.010** (0.005)
Share of years with unemployment benefits	0.055*** (0.017)	0.051*** (0.017)	-0.047*** (0.014)	-0.011* (0.005)
Share of years with welfare benefit receipt	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.009)	0.012* (0.007)	-0.003 (0.003)
Recall (1 = yes)	0.057*** (0.014)	0.065*** (0.014)	-0.047*** (0.011)	-0.006 (0.004)
Active labor market program (1 = yes)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.009 (0.015)	0.027** (0.012)	0.002 (0.005)
R-squared	0.115	0.116	0.167	0.077

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Results from an OLS model. Standard errors in parentheses. IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Reference group = group 3 with late IA. Further controls: Labor market agency, sectoral affiliation, position in last job (see Table 2) and month of assignment. N = 6,464.

Table A.6 Effects of the treatment on accumulated days in states until 30, 60, 90, 120, 180, and 360 days after random assignment for those predicted *not* to enter unemployment within 90 days

	Accumulated days in employment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.130 (0.302)	-0.174 (0.724)	-0.085 (1.164)	0.512 (1.576)	0.979 (2.430)	1.272 (4.896)
Early IA + AP	-0.057 (0.308)	-0.018 (0.738)	-0.223 (1.186)	0.140 (1.606)	0.893 (2.476)	2.634 (4.990)
Late IA + AP	-0.027 (0.305)	-0.863 (0.732)	-1.333 (1.177)	-1.391 (1.594)	-1.069 (2.457)	-0.568 (4.950)
Constant from model w/o covariates	26.335*** (0.221)	47.153*** (0.544)	66.589*** (0.873)	83.311*** (1.169)	116.224*** (1.785)	231.247*** (3.611)
	Accumulated days in unsubsidized employment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.173 (0.304)	-0.093 (0.728)	0.055 (1.172)	0.798 (1.586)	1.434 (2.441)	1.630 (4.927)
Early IA + AP	0.001 (0.310)	0.004 (0.742)	-0.291 (1.194)	0.008 (1.617)	0.627 (2.488)	2.401 (5.021)
Late IA + AP	0.068 (0.308)	-0.776 (0.736)	-1.339 (1.184)	-1.457 (1.604)	-1.233 (2.468)	-0.503 (4.981)
Constant from model w/o covariates	26.243*** (0.223)	46.975*** (0.547)	66.274*** (0.879)	82.772*** (1.176)	115.299*** (1.793)	228.858*** (3.635)
	Accumulated days in unemployment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.148 (0.289)	0.426 (0.696)	0.667 (1.117)	0.599 (1.512)	0.919 (2.309)	1.423 (4.293)
Early IA + AP	-0.042 (0.295)	-0.047 (0.709)	0.021 (1.139)	-0.253 (1.541)	-0.523 (2.353)	-3.786 (4.375)
Late IA + AP	-0.057 (0.292)	0.531 (0.703)	0.667 (1.130)	0.790 (1.529)	0.628 (2.334)	-1.448 (4.340)
Constant from model w/o covariates	3.312*** (0.211)	11.310*** (0.519)	20.398*** (0.830)	31.445*** (1.110)	53.031*** (1.677)	98.493*** (3.134)
	Accumulated days in active labor market programs on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.009 (0.028)	0.163 (0.104)	0.326 (0.210)	0.299 (0.327)	0.175 (0.581)	-0.183 (1.268)
Early IA + AP	-0.019 (0.029)	-0.102 (0.106)	-0.066 (0.214)	-0.252 (0.333)	-0.534 (0.592)	-0.340 (1.292)
Late IA + AP	-0.010 (0.029)	0.003 (0.105)	0.156 (0.213)	0.254 (0.331)	0.356 (0.587)	0.595 (1.282)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.063*** (0.020)	0.344*** (0.074)	0.756*** (0.149)	1.431*** (0.232)	3.063*** (0.411)	7.767*** (0.899)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Results from an OLS model. Standard errors in parentheses. IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Reference group = group 3 with late IA. Further controls: Variables from Table 2 (age in 4 age groups) and month of assignment. N = 4,579.

Table A.7 Effects of the treatment on accumulated days in states until 30, 60, 90, 120, 180, and 360 days after random assignment for those predicted to enter unemployment within 90 days

	Accumulated days in employment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.007 (0.560)	-0.319 (1.149)	-0.552 (1.801)	0.462 (2.398)	1.326 (3.569)	1.396 (7.119)
Early IA + AP	-0.475 (0.560)	-0.673 (1.150)	-0.343 (1.803)	1.148 (2.400)	2.538 (3.572)	4.718 (7.124)
Late IA + AP	-0.201 (0.556)	-0.663 (1.140)	-1.769 (1.788)	-2.765 (2.380)	-4.756 (3.543)	-9.042 (7.066)
Constant from model w/o covariates	23.359*** (0.411)	35.276*** (0.862)	46.494*** (1.348)	57.614*** (1.759)	87.959*** (2.537)	210.463*** (5.070)
	Accumulated days in unsubsidized employment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.001 (0.565)	-0.243 (1.152)	-0.385 (1.804)	0.692 (2.404)	1.684 (3.588)	2.406 (7.186)
Early IA + AP	-0.498 (0.566)	-0.673 (1.153)	-0.261 (1.806)	1.345 (2.406)	2.644 (3.591)	3.910 (7.191)
Late IA + AP	-0.219 (0.561)	-0.661 (1.144)	-1.773 (1.791)	-2.748 (2.386)	-4.908 (3.561)	-9.836 (7.132)
Constant from model w/o covariates	23.298*** (0.415)	35.153*** (0.865)	46.278*** (1.350)	57.202*** (1.763)	87.053*** (2.550)	207.847*** (5.129)
	Accumulated days in unemployment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.001 (0.551)	0.458 (1.160)	0.579 (1.832)	-0.145 (2.443)	-0.962 (3.537)	-4.810 (6.194)
Early IA + AP	0.486 (0.551)	0.816 (1.161)	0.525 (1.834)	-0.472 (2.445)	-1.312 (3.540)	-2.775 (6.199)
Late IA + AP	0.023 (0.546)	0.296 (1.152)	1.032 (1.819)	1.877 (2.425)	3.288 (3.511)	3.754 (6.148)
Constant from model w/o covariates	6.169*** (0.402)	22.765*** (0.865)	39.722*** (1.365)	56.092*** (1.792)	80.561*** (2.523)	120.622*** (4.397)
	Accumulated days in active labor market programs on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.052 (0.038)	-0.205 (0.188)	-0.233 (0.364)	-0.046 (0.541)	-0.101 (0.893)	-1.935 (1.693)
Early IA + AP	-0.044 (0.038)	-0.237 (0.188)	-0.183 (0.364)	-0.014 (0.542)	-0.307 (0.894)	-1.533 (1.695)
Late IA + AP	-0.034 (0.037)	-0.194 (0.186)	-0.132 (0.361)	0.326 (0.537)	1.031 (0.886)	1.918 (1.681)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.082*** (0.026)	0.592*** (0.130)	1.151*** (0.251)	1.608*** (0.373)	2.933*** (0.618)	6.596*** (1.180)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Results from an OLS model. Standard errors in parentheses. IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Reference group = group 3 with late IA. Further controls: Variables from Table 2 (age in 4 age groups) and month of assignment. N = 1,895.

**Table A.8 Effects of the treatment on being in a particular state
30, 60, 90, 120, 180, and 360 days after random assignment for those predicted
not to enter unemployment within 90 days**

	In employment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.019 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.019)	0.003 (0.019)	0.027 (0.020)	0.003 (0.020)	-0.007 (0.018)
Early IA + AP	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.006 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.020)	0.031 (0.020)	0.006 (0.020)	0.001 (0.019)
Late IA + AP	-0.028 (0.017)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.020)	0.013 (0.020)	-0.000 (0.020)	-0.010 (0.019)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.766*** (0.013)	0.666*** (0.014)	0.636*** (0.014)	0.523*** (0.015)	0.573*** (0.014)	0.692*** (0.014)
	In unsubsidized employment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.016 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	0.032 (0.020)	0.004 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.019)
Early IA + AP	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.019)	-0.015 (0.020)	0.031 (0.020)	0.003 (0.020)	0.001 (0.019)
Late IA + AP	-0.026 (0.017)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.023 (0.020)	0.011 (0.020)	-0.004 (0.020)	-0.008 (0.019)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.763*** (0.013)	0.662*** (0.014)	0.631*** (0.014)	0.514*** (0.015)	0.568*** (0.014)	0.682*** (0.014)
	In unemployment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.019 (0.017)	0.027 (0.018)	0.007 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.020)	0.002 (0.019)	0.007 (0.015)
Early IA + AP	0.003 (0.017)	0.004 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.001 (0.019)	-0.015 (0.016)
Late IA + AP	0.022 (0.017)	0.009 (0.018)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.016)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.207*** (0.012)	0.286*** (0.013)	0.308*** (0.014)	0.394*** (0.014)	0.331*** (0.014)	0.183*** (0.011)
	In a labor market program on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.002 (0.006)
Early IA + AP	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.006)
Late IA + AP	0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.009 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.007)	0.000 (0.006)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.003 (0.002)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.023*** (0.004)	0.032*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.004)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Results from an OLS model. Standard errors in parentheses. IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Reference group = group 3 with late IA. Further controls: Variables from Table 2 (age in 4 age groups) and month of assignment. N = 4,579

**Table A.9 Effects of the treatment on being in a particular state
30, 60, 90, 120, 180, and 360 days after random assignment for those predicted
to enter unemployment within 90 days**

	In employment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.034 (0.030)	0.011 (0.029)	0.033 (0.030)	0.034 (0.032)	-0.006 (0.031)	-0.005 (0.029)
Early IA + AP	-0.044 (0.030)	0.024 (0.029)	0.042 (0.030)	0.039 (0.032)	0.033 (0.031)	-0.007 (0.029)
Late IA + AP	-0.017 (0.030)	-0.019 (0.029)	-0.017 (0.030)	-0.038 (0.031)	-0.037 (0.031)	0.003 (0.029)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.533*** (0.023)	0.353*** (0.021)	0.371*** (0.022)	0.416*** (0.022)	0.567*** (0.022)	0.716*** (0.020)
	In unsubsidized employment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.032 (0.030)	0.013 (0.029)	0.036 (0.030)	0.034 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.001 (0.029)
Early IA + AP	-0.044 (0.030)	0.026 (0.029)	0.046 (0.030)	0.041 (0.032)	0.027 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.029)
Late IA + AP	-0.015 (0.030)	-0.019 (0.029)	-0.019 (0.030)	-0.037 (0.031)	-0.041 (0.031)	-0.001 (0.029)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.531*** (0.023)	0.351*** (0.021)	0.367*** (0.022)	0.410*** (0.022)	0.557*** (0.022)	0.710*** (0.021)
	In unemployment on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	0.041 (0.030)	-0.007 (0.030)	-0.025 (0.031)	-0.022 (0.032)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.023 (0.024)
Early IA + AP	0.057* (0.030)	-0.024 (0.030)	-0.024 (0.031)	-0.016 (0.032)	-0.025 (0.030)	0.005 (0.024)
Late IA + AP	0.010 (0.030)	0.005 (0.030)	0.015 (0.031)	0.035 (0.032)	0.015 (0.029)	-0.015 (0.024)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.433*** (0.023)	0.590*** (0.022)	0.551*** (0.022)	0.496*** (0.023)	0.345*** (0.021)	0.169*** (0.017)
	In a labor market program on day ...					
	30	60	90	120	180	360
Early IA	-0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.013 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.015* (0.008)
Early IA + AP	0.006 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.008)	0.000 (0.009)	0.009 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.009)	0.003 (0.008)
Late IA + AP	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.007 (0.009)	0.024** (0.010)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.008)
Constant from model w/o covariates	0.008** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.012* (0.007)	0.024*** (0.006)	0.018*** (0.005)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Results from an OLS model. Standard errors in parentheses. IA = integration agreement, AP = action plan. Reference group = group 3 with late IA. Further controls: Variables from Table 2 (age in 4 age groups) and month of assignment. N = 1,895.